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In many online communities, users reveal innovative and potentially valuable intellectual property (IP) underconditions that entail the risk of theft and imitation. When there is rivalry and formal IP law is not effective,
this could lead to underinvestment or withholding of IP, unless user-organized norms compensate for these
shortcomings. This study is the first to explore the characteristics and functioning of such a norms-based IP
system in the setting of anonymous, large-scale, and loose-knit online communities. To do so, we use data on
the Threadless crowdsourcing community obtained through netnography, a survey, and a field experiment. On
this basis, we identify an integrated system of well-established norms that regulate the use of IP within this
community. We analyze the system’s characteristics and functioning, and we find that the “legal certainty” it
provides is conducive to cooperation, cumulative effects, and innovation. We generalize our findings from the
case by developing propositions aimed to spark further research. These propositions focus on similarities and
differences between norms-based IP systems in online and off-line settings, and the conditions that determine
the existence of norms-based IP systems as well as their form and effectiveness in online communities. In this
way, we contribute to the literatures on norms-based IP systems and online communities and offer advice for
the management of crowdsourcing communities.
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1. Introduction
In online communities, loosely connected individual
actors reveal and exchange knowledge with peers who
share a common interest (Faraj et al. 2011, Wasko
and Faraj 2005). Although some of this activity might
inevitably be “hot air,” it can also involve the exchange
of valuable knowledge, making these communities
a potentially important innovation resource. Their
power is visible in the stupendous success of open
source software such as Linux or Apache (Lakhani and
von Hippel 2003, Lee and Cole 2003), collaborative
content-generation undertakings such as Wikipedia
(Giles 2005, Levine and Prietula 2013), crowd-science
activities such as Foldit or Galaxy Zoo (Franzoni
and Sauermann 2014), or in innovation tournaments
and crowdsourcing initiatives like Dell’s IdeaStorm
or IBM’s Innovation Jam (Bayus 2013, Bjelland and
Wood 2008, Boudreau and Lakhani 2013), to name
but a few examples. Almost by definition, commu-
nities are collaborative. Members give each other
feedback and help each other improve their ideas
and developments. This is particularly useful when
the resources required to solve the underlying prob-
lem are not all located within single individuals, but
are broadly distributed across multiple individuals
(Boudreau and Lakhani 2009, Dahlander and Frederik-
sen 2012, Franke and Shah 2003). Hayek (1945) already
argued that this is the norm rather than the excep-
tion in most circumstances. In such settings, exchang-
ing information and complementary resources consti-
tutes an enormous advantage, as it facilitates collective
intelligence (Bonabeau 2009). In this context, online
media offer the opportunity of accessing such infor-
mation independently of geographical constraints and
with very low transaction costs.
Generally, when valuable information is easily acces-
sible, the possibility of copying and imitation arises.
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Such behavior can be extremely fruitful. Social learning
theory suggests that copying from others is profitable
for the individual as a means of avoiding the costs
of trial-and-error learning (Kendal et al. 2005). At the
population level, the widespread reuse of ideas and
insights is evolutionarily superior (Rendell et al. 2009).
It economizes on the low marginal costs of knowledge
transfer relative to the cost of reinvention or repro-
duction (Arrow 1962), enables cumulative innovation
effects through refinement and improvement (Murray
and O’Mahony 2007), and may even spark radical
innovation through creative recombination (Raustiala
and Sprigman 2012). The importance of this principle
is aptly reflected in the metaphor of “standing on the
shoulders of giants” and also becomes visible in the
rapid advancement of scientific knowledge and inno-
vation (Scotchmer 1991) as well as the remarkable suc-
cess of humankind in general (Richerson and Boyd
2005). Research into communities has taken up this
perspective and suggested that to be successful, they
need to be designed as social learning systems in which
newcomers can benefit from the knowledge of more
experienced members (Wenger 2000).
However, copying and imitation can also be nega-
tive. Particularly in competitive settings, i.e., when the
use of intellectual property (IP) is rivalrous and when
individuals are extrinsically motivated, imitation may
in fact constitute theft of IP (Landes and Posner 2003).
If people experience or anticipate such opportunistic
free-riding behavior, this may lead to underinvestment
or withholding of information, thus impeding innova-
tion activities (Gans and Stern 2003). Therefore, formal
IP protection mechanisms such as patents and copy-
right have been introduced to facilitate the positive
effects of imitation while mitigating disincentives for
innovation (Arora et al. 2001, Gans and Stern 2003).
The problem is that formal IP protection is not always
fully effective.
Therefore, an alternative form of IP regulation has
emerged: norms-based IP systems (Oliar and Sprigman
2008). Unlike formal law enacted by legislative author-
ities or contracts, these systems build on collective
informal norms and are self-organized by the com-
munity (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010,
Oliar and Sprigman 2008). Extant research has ana-
lyzed norms-based IP systems in small and close-knit
“off-line” communities, such as elite circles, profes-
sional associations, and clubs (Dreyfuss 2010, Fauchart
and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010, Oliar and Sprigman
2008). In homogenous and nonanonymous groups, IP
norms can be easily established, and violations are
observable and can be sanctioned effectively (Di Ste-
fano et al. 2014).
In this article, we heed the call of researchers who
have postulated that “research in other settings is
needed to clarify when and why norms play a greater
or lesser role in regulating the use of transferred knowl-
edge” (Di Stefano et al. 2014, p. 1666; see also Fauchart
and von Hippel 2008).
Online communities appear to be a natural candi-
date for this endeavor as they are obviously systemat-
ically different from their off-line counterparts. Specif-
ically, online communities are often extremely large,
loose knit, and anonymous. Despite these conditions,
valuable IP is widely exchanged, even in communities
characterized by strong competitive elements (such
as collaborative crowdsourcing tournaments) and the
absence or relative weakness of formal IP protection.
This suggests that norms-based IP systems might oper-
ate here as well;1 however, we are not aware of any
extant research on this. Online communities also con-
stitute a particularly relevant research setting as they
are relatively new and we still lack a deeper under-
standing of how they function (Johnson et al. 2015).
Our research questions are twofold: First, we are
interested in the characteristics of norms-based IP sys-
tems in large online communities. What do they look
like? Which elements do they comprise? To what extent
are they similar or different from norms-based IP sys-
tems in off-line communities? Second, we wish to
understand their functioning in online settings. How do
the norms integrate into a system that facilitates “posi-
tive” copying and precludes “negative” copying? How
effective are such systems in achieving this end? Which
technological affordances enable them?
As this is the first study on norms-based IP systems
in the online context, we conducted a multimethod in-
depth case study that combines netnography, a survey,
and a field experiment. The research object chosen for
the study is the Threadless crowdsourcing community.
Threadless is a T-shirt company whose business model
is built on a permanent innovation tournament within
an extremely large online community (Boudreau and
Lakhani 2009). The community employs elements of
both cooperation and competition, suggesting that IP
regulation is a task of utmost importance. We gener-
alize findings from this setting by developing propo-
sitions aimed to spark further research. These propo-
sitions focus on similarities and differences between
norms-based IP systems in online and off-line settings,
and on the conditions that determine the existence of
norms-based IP systems as well as their form and effec-
tiveness in online communities.
The findings from the case study allow us to con-
tribute to two different strands of literature: research
on norms-based IP systems (Di Stefano et al. 2014, Fau-
chart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010, Oliar and
Sprigman 2008) and research on innovation in online
1 Beyond the area of IP, recent studies “offer evidence of the exis-
tence of norms in online communities” (Faraj and Johnson 2011,
p. 1469).
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communities (Dahlander and Frederiksen 2012, Faraj
et al. 2011, Jeppesen and Frederiksen 2006, O’Mahony
and Ferraro 2007, von Krogh et al. 2012, Wasko and
Faraj 2005). We do so by comparing and contrasting
norms-based IP systems in online settings with those
found in off-line settings and by proposing a contin-
gency view of norms-based IP systems in online com-
munities. Our findings are also of managerial interest.
The promise of “crowdsourcing” new product ideation
and design to online communities is great, and it is
frequently heralded as a paradigm shift in the orga-
nization of innovation (Baldwin and von Hippel 2011,
Cook 2008, O’Hern and Rindfleisch 2010, Prahalad and
Ramaswamy 2004, Seybold 2009, Sheth et al. 2000,
von Hippel 2005). Accordingly, an increasing number
of firms have experimented with crowdsourcing, only
to learn that success is by no means guaranteed (Euch-
ner 2010, Franke et al. 2013, Gächter et al. 2010). A bet-
ter understanding of the core aspect of IP and its effec-
tive protection might therefore help firms who plan to
outsource their idea generation to online communities.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
In Section 2, we review the literature our study is built
on, i.e., research on norms-based IP systems. In Sec-
tion 3, we briefly introduce our empirical setting and
research methods, after which we present our findings
regarding the characteristics (Section 4) and function-
ing (Section 5) of norms-based IP systems in online
communities. In Section 6, we offer 10 propositions
regarding norms-based IP systems in online commu-
nities and discuss managerial implications.
2. Norms-Based IP Systems
Norms are “powerful standards of behavior that are
rooted in widely shared beliefs about how actors
should behave” (Philippe and Durand 2011, p. 969).
A norms-based IP system is a system of social norms
that regulates IP rights within a collective of actors
(Fauchart and von Hippel 2008). Such systems per-
form the basic functions of law-based IP systems, i.e.,
protecting intellectual ideas and safeguarding invest-
ments in innovation. However, the development of
norms (legislative function), the assessment of individ-
ual cases (judiciary function), and the enforcement of
consequences (executive function) are essentially self-
organized instead of being handled by a central author-
ity (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010, Oliar
and Sprigman 2008, Raustiala and Sprigman 2012).
Norms-based IP systems exist as complements
(Bernstein 1992, Ellickson 1991) or as solitary systems
(Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010, Oliar
and Sprigman 2008) when formal IP systems such as
patent or copyright law are not fully effective (Oliar
and Sprigman 2008). This is the case when the scope of
formal IP systems is too limited (e.g., creating deriva-
tives from valuable IP, which often is legal, may cause
major damage; Di Stefano et al. 2014) or when legal
rules are costly or cumbersome to apply (which is the
reason why individuals or small firms often do not
enforce their legal IP rights through litigation; Bessen
and Meurer 2008).
Extant research has observed and described norms-
based IP systems in a variety of settings, all of which
happen to be off-line communities. For instance, Fau-
chart and von Hippel (2008) found that the French
haute cuisine community uses social norms to effec-
tively protect valuable recipes. Others have described
systems of social norms among magicians (Loshin
2010) as well as comedians (Oliar and Sprigman
2008), whose performance of tricks and jokes is not
effectively protected by IP law. These off-line commu-
nities share a number of properties that appear as pre-
conditions for effective norms-based IP systems. First,
their limited size allows strict entry control and makes
it possible to select participants for their explicit com-
mitment to the norms (Dreyfuss 2010). Loshin (2010)
provides compelling evidence on how difficult it is to
enter a community and how easily suspected viola-
tors may be excluded. A second characteristic is the
long-term orientation of members, who typically seek
enduring membership (Posner 2002); this facilitates a
process of becoming socialized to the norms of the
community and provides an incentive to adhere to
them, as one’s membership might otherwise be at risk
(Ellickson 1991). The small size of the community and
dense relationships support the visibility of behavior,
which appears to be a precondition for being able to
observe norm conformity among community mem-
bers (Coleman 1990, Fauchart and von Hippel 2008,
Raustiala and Sprigman 2012). This is crucial for the
functioning of a norms-based IP system because indi-
vidual members are only willing to rely on social
norms if they can observe others actually complying
with them (Di Stefano et al. 2014). All these charac-
teristics support high homogeneity among community
members in terms of backgrounds, objectives, and val-
ues, which supports the acceptance of and adherence
to norms-based IP systems (Preece 2000). Finally, it is
easy for small, stable, and close-knit communities to
punish an offender of norms, e.g., by limiting access to
valuable community resources, imposing social sanc-
tions, or effecting reputational penalties (Fauchart and
von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010). For example, Fau-
chart and von Hippel (2008) found that by simply dis-
tributing a note to a number of colleagues, chefs can
instantly damage the reputation of a suspected viola-
tor, and other accomplished chefs are likely to deny
requests for recipes and future collaboration.
Online communities usually diverge widely from
all of those conditions. First, most online communities
have very limited entry control mechanisms (Brabham
2008, Fleming and Waguespack 2007, O’Mahony and
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Ferraro 2012). A one-time registration with a username
and password is typically sufficient. It is a unilateral
decision that typically does not involve any examina-
tion of qualifications, intentions, or past achievements.
In online communities, unconstrained self-selection
is seen as one of the key success factors for inno-
vation (Lakhani and Panetta 2007), as it is difficult
to anticipate who will provide the best contribution
to the task set (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013, Franke
et al. 2014). A second difference is that participants
often join online communities for a limited time only,
which may weaken socialization processes and loyalty
to the community (Bayus 2013, Dahlander and Fred-
eriksen 2012, Fleming and Waguespack 2007). Third,
online communities are typically quite heterogeneous
(Boudreau and Lakhani 2009). Participants are often
dispersed across the globe and might have very dif-
ferent backgrounds, objectives, roles, and values. This
makes ex ante notions of IP norms unlikely to be sim-
ilar (Husted 2000), hampering the establishment of a
shared and joint understanding (Conklin 2005). Like
unrestricted access, the heterogeneity of participants
is also seen as a major success factor for innovation
in online communities (Estellés-Arolas and González-
Ladrón-de-Guevara 2012), suggesting that it cannot be
reduced without jeopardizing the overall value of gen-
erating innovative and surprising solutions (Lakhani
et al. 2007). Furthermore, individual misconduct is
typically hardly visible in online communities, mainly
because they can become extremely large. Again, their
size is seen as a major success factor for innovation,
as exemplified in Raymond’s (1999, p. 30) famous
“Linus’s Law,” which states that, “Given enough eye-
balls, all bugs are shallow.” However, the resulting vol-
ume of information clearly complicates the detection of
norm violations (Tapscott and Williams 2008). Finally,
individuals typically act anonymously and can easily
change or delete their identities in online crowdsourc-
ing communities (Dholakia et al. 2004), which makes it
easy to escape censure or prosecution. Taken together,
these characteristics can be seen as strong arguments
that norms-based IP systems might work differently
in online communities compared to those examined in
extant studies. This is the starting point of our research.
3. MultimethodCase Study
To investigate exactly how norms-based IP systems
operate in online communities, we focused on the
case of an online community that is particularly well
suited for our research. We studied the community
in depth using multiple methods (Jick 1979). First,
we analyzed posts using a “netnographic” approach
(Kozinets 2002). Our reasoning is that it should be
possible to reconstruct IP-related norms based on past
discussions among community members. Second, to
triangulate our findings, we conducted a survey in the
community and asked to what extent the system of
norms actually mirrors extant norms. Finally, we car-
ried out a field experiment to test the extent to which
the norm system is merely “cheap talk” or works effec-
tively. We did so by intentionally violating norms; we
copied 64 existing designs, submitted them under false
names, and observed what happened.
3.1. Research Setting: The Threadless.com
Community
We selected the crowdsourcing firm Threadless and its
community as the setting of our research. Threadless
has a crowdsourcing platform on which designers sub-
mit innovative T-shirt designs and other community
members vote and give feedback on the designs. The
ideas that receive the best scores from the community
(and the most positive evaluation by Threadless staff
members) are actually printed on T-shirts.
The platform is well suited to the purpose of our
research. First, it has strong cooperative elements, as
community members reveal their IP on the platform by
posting draft designs and asking for feedback before
entering a design in the competition. Other members
offer improvement suggestions or refer to other work
as an inspiration or reference. Overall, the spirit of
the Threadless community appears highly constructive
and developmental. Community members appreciate
that peer feedback helps them become better design-
ers (Brabham 2010). At the same time, Threadless also
has strong competitive elements. Many members sub-
mit designs, but only a few of them are eventually
produced. The incentives are the rivalrous goods of
money and reputation. IP issues are highly relevant
for participants because they retain the rights to their
IP until Threadless selects the T-shirt design for pro-
duction, after which the rights are transferred to the
company. This arrangement and the co-occurrence of
cooperation and competition make IP regulation a cen-
tral issue. The main advantage of this particular case,
however, is that it is so extreme. The Threadless com-
munity is exceptionally large and heterogeneous. Piller
(2011) reported 2.5 million unique visitors in August
2010, and Threadless indicates that it has 3.2 million
anonymous and self-selected participants who aver-
age between 34,000 and 60,000 visits to the site on
any given day (Jeff Guerrero, Artist and Community
Liaison at Threadless, email May 2, 2014). Users are
globally distributed (our 166 survey participants came
from at least 24 different countries on 5 continents)
and differ vastly in terms of their backgrounds, profes-
sions, and participation motives (Brabham 2010). Thus,
it is virtually impossible for the organizing company
to safeguard the participants’ IP rights as a central
authority. On the other hand, Threadless is one of the
most successful examples of crowdsourcing platforms,
suggesting that it might allow us to draw conclusions
about how IP issues can be regulated effectively.
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3.2. Netnographic Approach
Like traditional ethnography, netnography is a natural-
istic method that provides researchers with a window
into naturally occurring behaviors (Kozinets 2002). Its
main advantage is that it is unobtrusive. User behav-
ior is captured and stored automatically on the Web,
meaning that data do not necessarily have to be col-
lected in real time. Our data collection and analysis fol-
lowed an iterative process. In many cases, social norms
are not visible, especially if a system of norms func-
tions well and actors conform to it (Arrow 1970). Yet
tacit norms become evident when they are breached
(Garfinkel 1991), and we assume that this also holds
for IP norms. For this reason, we focused on analyzing
cases in which community members accused others
of violating community IP norms. Because of the vast
amount of data (billions of posts on Threadless.com), it
was critical to search for relevant cases systematically.
In multiple steps, a panel of 15 trained research assis-
tants, all of them familiar with the Threadless com-
munity, developed a search heuristic based on a list
of 10 keywords (“already printed”; “copied design”;
“copied my”; “copy/paste”; “existing design”; “imita-
tion”; “intellectual property”; “rip off”; “same design”;
“zero”). This initial search resulted in a database
of 1,224,579 discussion posts that were subsequently
screened for IP issues by the team. The comments in-
cluded many false positives, i.e., search results that did
not relate to IP violations. Eventually, we identified 196
threads with 6,424 posts for further analysis. Among
them, 155 threads were triggered by an alleged design
copy case, while the remaining 41 contained more gen-
eral discussions about IP violations.
We analyzed the relevant comments using open cod-
ing (Strauss and Corbin 1990) to identify first-order
concepts, i.e., themes regarding the handling of IP
issues that recurred consistently throughout the 6,424
discussion posts. We then used axial coding (Miles and
Huberman 1994, Strauss and Corbin 1990) to group the
first-order concepts into second-order concepts, result-
ing in a set of seven distinct norms for the handling
of IP in the Threadless community. After two itera-
tions of analyzing all IP-related discussions, we did not
find any additional norms, suggesting that the set we
identified is exhaustive. Subsequently, we used selec-
tive coding and memoing (Charmaz 2006) to identify
relationships between norms and to understand the
functioning of the norms-based system as a whole.
Throughout our analysis, we paid close attention to
the context of each case, such as the specifics of the
copied design or particularities in the way in which
the violation was handled. Through this intense study
of the data over several months, the research team
obtained an in-depth understanding of how the com-
munity views and handles IP issues.
As participation in such online discussions is volun-
tary, there is a risk of self-selection bias. Theoretically, it
is possible that only individuals with extreme opinions
regarding IP norms took the time to post in response
to IP violations, meaning that the norms reconstructed
would not be representative of the community. There-
fore, we triangulated our database with two more data
sources.
3.3. Survey
The objective of the survey was to find out whether or
not the norms-based IP system we reconstructed using
netnography matches the perceptions of the Thread-
less community. In the questionnaire, we asked, “In
the following, we have listed some rules about copying
designs that might or might not apply to the Threadless
community. Would you give us your opinion?” Then
each of the norms was listed, and participants could
indicate their opinions regarding their prevalence
(“This is a well-established rule among members”; 1 =
strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree) and whether they
would adhere to this norm (“Personally, I would fol-
low this rule under all circumstances”; 1 = strongly
agree, 5 = strongly disagree). We inserted an open sec-
tion where participants could comment and add norms
(“Are there important unwritten rules regarding the
copying of designs we have missed? Please describe
them in the blank box below.”). To ensure comprehen-
sibility, we conducted a pretest based on a convenience
sample with n= 52 respondents.
The link to the online survey was posted on the
community site by a Threadless community manager
together with a call for participation. The announce-
ment emphasized that the questionnaire was confi-
dential and for research purposes only. The survey
remained online for six weeks. In the first two days,
146 people completed the questionnaire, and the final
total came to 166 respondents. As Threadless was
not able to provide us with demographic information
on its community members—its composition changes
permanently and the number of incomplete profiles,
“dead” accounts, and double entries is unknown—we
could not compare the sample characteristics with the
overall population (see Table A.1 in the appendix). On
a qualitative basis, Threadless members assessed the
sample as representative of the community. A compar-
ison of early and late respondents showed that there
is no significant difference between the groups except
for the control variables visits to website (p < 0001) and
interaction with other members (p < 0001), which means
that highly active Threadless community members are
overrepresented in our survey sample. To analyze the
consequences of this bias, we segmented our data in
various ways (members with versus without submit-
ted designs, frequent versus occasional visits to the
website, frequent versus occasional interaction with
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other members) and compared active participants with
less active participants. These intrasample compar-
isons showed no significant differences in opinions
about the norms, which suggests that the findings
might be generalized to the community as a whole (see
also Section 6).
One potential threat in surveys on value-laden top-
ics such as ethics or social norms is social desirability
(Grimm 2010, Randall and Fernandes 1991). Theoret-
ically, responses might reflect what participants sense
should be the norm rather than their true feelings and
actual behavior regarding the norm. To analyze the
extent to which the respondents’ answers were valid,
we checked whether they conformed to those norms
in their actual behavior. This was possible because
respondents provided us with their Threadless user-
names. We developed a Web crawler to search the
Threadless platform for all interactions in which the
survey respondents were involved (>85,000 posts). On
the basis of 1,500 comments, we developed a coding
scheme for identifying cases of norm violation. We
then drew a random subsample of 20% of the origi-
nal sample (33 survey participants), and two indepen-
dent research assistants analyzed their 21,671 posts in
detail (98.5% accordance). The overall result of our val-
idation study is convincing: We found discrepancies in
only 0.9% of all cases where a user indicated adher-
ence to a norm (1 or 2 on a five-point Likert scale).
In sum, the data from the survey appear sufficiently
valid. To provide further corroboration, we conducted
a field experiment.
3.4. Field Experiment
In this experiment, we intentionally violated the IP
rights of Threadless community members by copy-
ing randomly chosen user designs and posting them
as new submissions to Threadless. If our account of
the norms-based IP system is correct, then we should
observe the reactions as predicted. With the full con-
sent of Threadless, each week we randomly selected
three designs from all of the submissions Threadless
had received that week, resulting in a total of 64
designs (see Table A.2 in the appendix). Our sample
included frequently rated designs as well as submis-
sions that were seen and scored by only a few people
(number of scores received, mean = 272.88, SD = 130.53).
We then copied and submitted them under various
false names four weeks after their original submission.
During this delay period, roughly 1,200 other designs
were submitted, which means that the detection of the
copy was by no means trivial. We randomly varied the
exact days on which we submitted the three copies and
stretched the experiment over a period of six months
to avoid generating “artificial” alertness due to poten-
tially recognizable patterns or an excessive number
of violations. We monitored our submissions on the
Threadless platform and measured the time until the
fraud was detected by the community. Upon detection,
we took screenshots of the immediate user reactions for
further analysis. Our agreement with Threadless stip-
ulated that as soon as someone detected the copy, both
the design and the profile used to submit the design
would be removed.2 To not endanger the test, we did
not inform the original designers. Finally, we system-
atically analyzed the responses by coding the norms
that became visible in each instance (two independent
coders; 100% accordance).
4. Characteristics of theNorms-Based
IP System in the Threadless
Community
Our first finding is the “gestalt” of the norms-based
IP system within the Threadless community. We were
able to reconstruct a parsimonious set of seven well-
established IP norms. Three are related to copying as
such (Norms 1–3), three norms concern the process
of handling an alleged case of copying (Norms 4–6),
and one deals with sanctions in the case of an IP
norm infringement (Norm 7). Most survey participants
(86.6%) indicated that they “agree” or “strongly agree”
that this set of norms is established in the Threadless
community (mean = 1.76, SD = 0.844), and 92.7% indi-
cated that they adhere to those norms (1 and 2 on a
five-point Likert scale; mean = 1.44, SD = 0.711). The
responses to the open survey question (asking for any
additional informal rules regarding copying that we
had missed) did not suggest any further norms, and
those responses yielded strong illustrative support for
the ones we had reconstructed. In the following, we
describe them individually.
Norm 1: You must not copy designs. On December 29,
2007, the user “legendarypinkdots”3 submitted the
design “WD” (Figure 1) in the Threadless “Critiques”
section, a place for designers to upload drafts to get
community feedback on how to improve the design.
Only 12 minutes later, another user detected that the
design was a one-to-one copy of the design “Mac-
Gyver” (Figure 1(a)) by the user “Glenn Smith” and
posted the following:
DON’T SUBMIT! or else you’ll be sorry. (HFHF)
A few minutes later, the next user complained and
included a link to the original design:
OH NO YOU DI-NT! OH NO YOU DI-NT. (Bourdieu)
2 In a few cases, e.g., when the copy was detected on a weekend,
it took somewhat longer to have our copy and profile removed by
Threadless.
3 All usernames have been changed by the authors.
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Figure 1 (Color online) Examples of Different Types of Copy Cases
Original design Original design element Original concept
Copied design Copied design element Copied concept
(a) (b) (c)
One-to-one copy in the
“WD” copy case
Copy of design elements in the
“Hammer 80” copy case
Concept copy in the
“fly_butter” copy case
Within less than one hour, community members
had posted another 10 comments, all condemning leg-
endarypinkdots’ blatant violation, for example:
Wtf? please tell me this is a joke. (johannes)
SUBMIT! I would totally wear this!—Oh wait, I wore it
yesterday. (Chingachgook)
I guess legendarypinkdots has a good sense of humor,
nah? :) (Grubi_Lauri)
The case ended on February 10, 2008, with the dele-
tion of legendarypinkdots’ design.
We found 36 cases of completely identical copies,
which means that they were relatively rare. In all
of those cases, the community reacted furiously (see
Table 1). This allows us to conclude that “You must
not copy designs” is indeed a central norm within the
Threadless community. Its members are designers and
design enthusiasts, many of whom work hard to create
unique designs to win a contest and to gain a reputa-
tion as creative designers among their peers. They do
not want free riders to gain financial or reputational
rewards, so they help each other protect their origi-
nal work by commenting on designs that violate this
norm:
No one deserves 1,000 dollars for ripping off another
person’s shirt. (Captainbeefh)
You’re taking credit for something someone else did.
(sunstar180)
Besides one-to-one copies of a complete design,
which not only infringe on community norms but also
violate Threadless’ formal terms and conditions as well
as U.S. and international copyright law, there are two
other issues regulated by the norm. The first is emu-
lating design elements, that is, copying only parts of
a complete design (for an example, see Figure 1(b)).
While copyright law can be ambivalent in such cases
(Besen and Raskind 1991, Smith 1993), Norm 1 of the
Threadless community clearly prohibits such behavior.
On January 28, 2011, for example, the user “Muddleal”
submitted their design “Hammer 80,” with elements
taken from another design. The next day, “CoolGiggs”
discovered it and posted the following comment:
Why did you steal the hair from Lovely Face? [link to
original design]
The alleged copier tried to argue with CoolGiggs,
but more and more community members joined in and
accused her of stealing the design element:
Stolen from a printed design0 0 00. (PygmyTwylyte)
Muddleal tried to argue why she thought that the
design was a reference and not a copy, but those words
fell on deaf ears in the community. The case ended with
the censure of Muddleal. Again, this is not an isolated
case. In 33 (21.3%) of the copy cases we analyzed, users
referred to partial copies of designs.
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Table 1 Overview of IP Norms
Summary of norm and support Central concepts found
in survey results in netnography Sample quotes
Norm 1: “You must not copy designs”
96.4% “strongly agree” or “agree” that
this norm is an established rule
(mean = 1.25, SD = 0.51).
98.8% “strongly agree” or “agree” that
they always adhere to this norm
(mean = 1.07, SD = 0.29).
One-to-one copy
prohibited
“Obviously there are 7 people who do not know that this is
ALREADY a shirt 0 0 0 and i mean, exactly this shirt has
already been done.” (bemoan)
“This is a shirt already!!!! are u insane?!”
(Android_affection)
“This is a total rip-off of heartcore” (lightmyfire)
“Using a similar concept is one thing, but outright
plagiarism? Wow 0 0 0” (Boots003)
Copying of design
elements prohibited
“Why did you steal the hair from Sweety? [link to original
design]” (CoolGiggs)
“I just examined both heads and They are exact. come on.
The same little sprig of hair in the front? the SAME
highlight in the head? The little fold in the shirt above the
pants? The bulge in the tricep area of his right arm?”
(Ilbollocks)
“Dude, when the cow is exactly the same shape with all the
spots in the same place, it is pretty for sure stolen. Sure
the original artist didn’t invent the cow, but she did
invent this particular cow.” (Miss Piggy)
Concept copying
prohibited
“Following a particular style isn’t a problem, rather it’s the
submissions that steal other’s exact design concepts.
There is nothing original, creative, or innovative about
this design. Sorry to sound like a *****, but it’s true.”
(ljido)
“Same exact idea.” (my name is Michael Caine)
“Dont **** with the [tee concept]. come up with your own
ideas you *******. i feel like making 5 new acounts and
giving you a zero on them all.” (twneverhouse)
Norm 2: “If you wish to copy, you must ask
the original designer”
89.2% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 1.55,
SD = 0.74).
95.8% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 1.22,
SD = 0.55).
Ask for permission “Did you get the original guys permission? probably
not 0 0 0 I think that’s where the problem lies.” (plumphone)
“She should have asked the artist’s permission—but then,
how do we know that she didn’t?” (Asterix)
“I wrote to Jamee love and he told me that it was ok for
him, and that if i wanted i should submit my design. So
everything’s ok with Jamee. [link]. Peace everyone”
(caponos)
Norm 3: “If you copy, you must credit the
original designer”
79.4% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 1.76,
SD = 0.88).
91.5% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 1.33,
SD = 0.73).
Give detailed references
when submitting a
partly copied design
“Inspired by [name of original design7, i decided to do my
own version. i kinda like it =5” (beer)
“The fact that people mess with and modify my work and
redistribute it without my permission, and without fully
crediting me, really makes me mad. Copying (which
amounts to theft) is not a compliment.” (jellybeans)
Norm 4: “If you are suspicious about the
origin of a design, you must check
whether it is a copy”
83.0% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 1.72,
SD = 0.85).
94.5% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 1.36,
SD = 0.71).
In case of suspicion, look
for original source
“Hmm, that vampire bat sure looks familiar 0 0 0 I wonder
why I could TRACE it back to 0 0 0google image search
vampire bat anyone?” (smiley)
“This one might be changed enough but it looks familiar
[link to original and suspected copy]. This one looks
familiar, but I’m not sure [link to original and suspected
copy]” (steaky)
“Threadless police” mem-
bers who are especially
suspicious
“!!!RIP OFF ARTIST STEALING WORK—PLEASE HELP!!!
Caught this dude on Society6 ripping off well known
Threadless artists including myself and thought I might
take a stronger stance on this matter.” (billanderson)
“Threadless police force crackdown strikes again.” (stan!)
“Get over yourselves, plagiarism police.” (faz-desert)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Summary of norm and support Central concepts found
in survey results in netnography Sample quotes
Norm 5: “If you find that a design was
copied, you must make the case public”
80.0% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 1.75,
SD = 0.87).
78.8% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 1.73,
SD = 0.97).
Alert the community “Hi all! I stumbled across this design [link to copy] and instantly
recognised it as being very similar to [link to original] by Betty
Whiteman. Betty is extremely talented and very supportive to
other artists so this was **** to see. Just thought I’d let you
guys know here as not too sure where else to report it. Happy
drawing!” (Dumb Marc)
“The person who created this is named Monty. I know as I
shared a brief artistic discourse with her many years ago when
I still used DA. You need to take this down. Now.” (Justcaught)
Inform inexperienced
members about norms
“People—especially younger kids—coming to Threadless from a
fanart community could easily have totally different
expectations of what is/isn’t acceptable.” (mismonaut)
“The really only thing that helps it’s being sometime here and
learning the dos and don’ts, be willing to learn and suck it up
if reprehended.” (ivanrodero)
Norm 6: “The public trial must be fair”
88.5% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 1.50,
SD = 0.71).
97.6% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 1.46,
SD = 0.46).
Never falsely accuse
someone
[Reference to a case, where someone was falsely accused] “That
was shameful **** on behalf of the community.”
(casco—blog entry)
“It’s impossible not to make mistakes from time to time, but the
persons that participate in the rip blog I think we do it for
doing the better for all and not the wrong, we could jump and
say that’s not yours! but we prepare our case, we research
before we say something.” (ghghg)
Provide proof (in the form
of a link or a
reference)—do not
accuse without proof
“I dunno, I see the similarities, but is there an iron clad picture to
this story? I mean, it looks like they both draw creatures. So
does Jon Freud 0 0 0where is the theft? I am not saying that
anyone is innocent or guilty, I just want to see exactly where
the proof of a rip off is.” (MRIllinois)
“I require proof before I take any sort of action.” (Rebel123)
“Yeah, i don’t think people should start yelling ‘rip’ until they
know for certain. that’s really lame.” (yourBee)
Give the copier the
chance to defend
themselves
“If someone has a design very close to someone else it doesn’t
mean that it’s copied. Great minds think alike very often. Give
the designer the right to explain himself.” (Survey response)
“If a designer is accused of copying a design, it’s fair and
appropriate to give them the opportunity to defend their
actions and/or refute the claim.” (Survey response)
Norm 7: “If someone has been caught
copying a design, you must join in the
collective sanctioning”
66.1% “strongly agree” or “agree” that this
norm is an established rule (mean = 2.04,
SD = 1.16).
64.2% “strongly agree” or “agree” that they
always adhere to this norm (mean = 2.11,
SD = 1.10).
Downvote design “Big fat zero its not cool, funny, or interesting.” (los mopsos)
“I OWN THIS SHIRT FROM HARDCORE. ZERO FOR YOU.”
(webdeflandre)
“Boooo complete zero for stealing an idea.” (mrert2s)
Warn other members
about voting
“If it’s proved that a design is a complete copy, the community
members should be warned before voting on the copier’s other
designs.” (Threadless user, open section in survey)
“EVERYBODY VOTE THIS AS A 0!!!!!!” (JonnyStella)
Censure “ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO
Go slit your throat and stop stealing t-shirt designs.”
(VictoriaGreta)
“Get your own ideas kids,..... really. Have you no Shame? You
baffle me.” (dgfrankini)
“BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD PERSON YOU! FOR SHAME!
BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD! BAD! STUPID BAD NO NO
NO NO NO BAD PERSON YOU!” (iffland1489)
Observe copier “If I know that one design has been plagiarized, I will look much
more critically at other designs, as there is reason to suspect
that they are not the submitter’s original work. That being said,
I don’t deliberately give lower scores to the other submissions
if they appear to be original.” (diebshnucker, blog entry)
“Get caught once, and be placed under the microscope from then
on.” (Survey response)
Involve Threadless “[posted link] Like the others said, it’s stolen. I’ve informed the
artist that you used his picture. I’m not sure how to report a
copyright violation on threadless but I’m definitely going to
find out.” (John_Jordan)
“Threadless should definitely follow up on this one!!” (wemmi)
Note. The quotes have not been edited, except for removing profanities, which are replaced by ∗∗∗∗.
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Another form of imitation is to copy the concept,
i.e., the central idea behind a design. Concept copies
are more subtle and thus more difficult to identify.
For example, the user “balcon” submitted the design
“fly_butter” on January 23, 2006 (see Figure 1(c)),
which imitates an already existing concept based on
a pun with “butter” and “butterfly.” The community
reacted instantly:
There have been like 3 subs about butterflies just like
this. (IrvingWashington)
Seriously, I’m beginning to think that there’s some kind
of secret Threadless society hell-bent on submitting the
same damn mediocre ideas in (slightly) varying forms.
Imitation may be a form of flattery, but we need to draw
the line somewhere, right? (Wintergreen)
So so overdone. 0 for originality 2 for execution.
(CalebM)
The case ended on January 24, 2006, with severe cen-
sure of the copier. As copying the concept behind a
design is technically not a copy of that design, for-
mal copyright law is not applicable (Denicola 1979),
nor are Threadless’ terms and conditions. This means
that community Norm 1 is particularly strict. Copy-
ing ideas is seen as an infringement against which the
community needs to be protected. Naturally, this form
of imitation is more ambiguous than the other two.
Coincidences do happen, and it can be difficult to dis-
tinguish between inspiration and imitation:
Sometimes there’s a thin line between copying, and
coincidentally having the same idea with a different
execution. (Survey response)
Similar concept does not equate to copied designs 0 0 0
know the difference! (Survey response)
As a consequence, many of the cases of copying we
studied included debates on whether or not a design
was an illegitimate copy of another user’s concept.
A total of 91 cases of copying (58.7%) dealt with this
violation of Norm 1. We observed that users often dis-
cussed and negotiated these conflicts intensely. The
key criteria for determining whether or not a copy
was legitimate are its originality and creativity. This
issue was brought up in 46.1% of all cases where a
concept had been copied. Copies of concepts are not
accepted by the Threadless community when the exe-
cution is weak, the copy is unoriginal, or there are
several (unoriginal) submissions of a concept within
a few weeks or months (“overused concepts”). Often
there are design trends, “genres,” or design elements
(pandas, sunflowers, rainbows, etc.) that come up very
often. These concepts are well known within the com-
munity, and designers are expected to be sensitive and
avoid overusing such elements.
Overall, Norm 1 is the central IP norm and the start-
ing point for the other norms. It is in line with re-
search on norms in off-line communities that also pro-
hibit copying (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin
2010, Oliar and Sprigman 2008). Similarly, the way in
which Norm 1 allows for distinctions between posi-
tive and negative copying closely resembles the func-
tioning of norms against copying in off-line commu-
nities. For example, the magicians’ community bene-
fits when members borrow from others and tweak or
refine the execution of tricks in a creative way (Loshin
2010). To enable social learning and cumulative effects,
it is important that community members apply this
norm with some discretion in both online and off-line
communities, as an overly restrictive ban on imita-
tion would inhibit the development of the commu-
nity rather than spark innovation (Raustiala and Sprig-
man 2012). In the Threadless community, this mindful
application of Norm 1 becomes visible in the online
discussions around each submission.
Norm 2: If you wish to copy, you must ask the orig-
inal designer. Copying parts of designs or reusing a
concept is not invariably prohibited in the Threadless
community. Exceptions are possible with the origi-
nal designer’s permission. By transparently indicating
that a new submission was inspired by another design
and that they obtained the original designer’s ap-
proval, users are able to show other community mem-
bers that they did not steal it. The original designer
has the opportunity to evaluate whether or not the par-
tial copy or concept design is sufficiently original to
be submitted and is thus enabled to veto the submis-
sion of the derivative design. However, we did not find
a single instance of such a veto in our netnography.
This suggests that one can expect other community
members to be generous in giving permission to reuse
parts of their designs or a concept. The moral obli-
gation to share largely corresponds to the “fair use”
doctrine (e.g., Posner 1992) and to the public uproar
against artists who do not consent to the reuse of their
work, as in the case of Lady Gaga objecting to Weird
Al Yankovic’s parody of her song “Born This Way”
(Alexiou 2011), to name but one example. In our netno-
graphic analysis, we found 11 cases in which this norm
was explicitly mentioned (Table 1). Its prevalence was
further substantiated when we extended the netno-
graphic focus to blog entries and to comments on cases
where no accusations had been made. We came across
many more references to this norm, for example,
While working on this someone pointed out to me
that something similar has been done by House aka
“the wonderful” Electric Steak. I contacted House and
he was okay with me submitting this! Thanks House!
Hope you all like this design! (MichaelKenyon)
Norm 2 exists in a similar form in off-line communi-
ties. It is typically expected that community members
will not make use of others’ ideas without permission
from the originator. Although it also seems to be com-
mon in off-line communities to pass on IP to others
(e.g., accomplished chefs share valuable recipes with
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apprentices, Fauchart and von Hippel 2008), it appears
that sharing IP in the off-line world is rather selec-
tive (Di Stefano et al. 2014). French chefs and comedi-
ans have even developed an informal trade in recipes
(mimicking the law of trade secrecy; Raustiala and
Sprigman 2012) to control and limit the proliferation of
their IP. Interestingly, our netnography did not provide
any indication that community members in the online
setting are similarly selective. Such open willingness to
share is not uncommon in online communities; other
studies have found that to enhance public recognition
of their creativity, individuals may prefer to reveal their
IP rather than to protect it from use by others (Lerner
and Tirole 2002, Wasko and Faraj 2005). Nevertheless,
Norm 2 seems to have an important function, as it sig-
nals that the copy is legitimate.
Norm 3: If you copy, you must credit the original designer.
Closely related to Norm 2 is the norm requiring design-
ers to cite the original design if they borrow concepts
or design elements with permission from the original
creator. When they do so, the important effects of inspi-
ration, cross-fertilization, and accumulation are facili-
tated, while the achievement of the original designer
is still acknowledged. In a way, this norm resembles
citations in scholarly works (Merton 1965). We found
references to this norm in 11 cases (Table 1).
If designers are inspired by someone else and make
creative designs by reusing some elements, it is their
responsibility to comply with both Norms 2 and 3. By
obtaining the original designer’s consent and acknowl-
edging the original source, designers can take advan-
tage of “legal certainty.” Norm 3 is beneficial not only
for designers who copy but also for the original design-
ers by increasing their visibility and reputation. Com-
pliance with Norm 3 shows other community mem-
bers that building on others’ work can be acceptable
or even desirable within the community as long as the
copy is executed with a sufficient level of originality in
its own right. Such a signal, in turn, may spark cumu-
lative innovation and creative recombination.
Norms-based IP systems in off-line communities
also stipulate that community members should give
credit by referring to the original creators and express
gratitude to them for sharing their IP (see, e.g., Fau-
chart and von Hippel 2008 on the community norms of
French chefs). As is the case with Norm 3, the norms
of attribution in off-line communities make sure that
some of the awards for the innovation go to the origi-
nator. Several studies of off-line communities provide
compelling evidence that widespread imitation and
acknowledgment of ideas results in fame and reputa-
tion for originators within and beyond their respec-
tive communities (Loshin 2010, Raustiala and Sprig-
man 2012).
Norm 4: If you are suspicious about the origin of a de-
sign, you must check whether it is a copy. The IP-related
norms in the Threadless community do not apply to
designers alone. As individual designers are unable
to secure their IP by themselves, community members
are expected to jointly take on a “policing” role, i.e.,
to check whether newly submitted designs are copied.
Indeed, the vast majority of norm violations we stud-
ied were uncovered by the community. They were de-
tected by the originators in only 5 out of 155 cases.
Widespread adherence to this policing norm implies
that the Threadless community can rely on multilat-
eral monitoring and enforcement of social norms, a
mechanism that can be highly effective (Bowles and
Gintis 2002, Ostrom 1990). We found 42 references to
this norm in the cases we analyzed using netnography
(Table 1).
Accordingly, this important function is relatively
broadly distributed. The 155 cases of copying were de-
tected by a total of 111 different community members,
97 of whom spotted only one case each. However, a
certain division of labor and specialization of roles can
also be observed. Fourteen individuals detected multi-
ple copies (up to 11 cases). Those individuals actively
search for stolen designs, and upon detecting a sus-
pected copy, they trace early draft designs in critique
sections or blogs to evaluate who was the original
creator and to acquire proof that it is an illegitimate
copy. They are sometimes even called the “Threadless
police” and appear to have developed some pride in
their role:
Threadless police force crackdown strikes again. (stan!)
The community approves of their work and the valu-
able function they perform. This is visible in many
comments, such as the following:
You deserve a badge for this stuff. (muli)
Whoah 0 0 0good catch Eric! (leppihnov)
Damn 0 0 0nice catch. (Tapirmouse)
Members who specialize in this policing role are
highly productive designers for whom the functioning
of the norms-based IP system is crucial. A closer anal-
ysis of three users (among our 166 survey participants)
who fall into the category of “Threadless police” illus-
trates this point. All three were long-term members of
the community (mean = 5075 years) and had submit-
ted a large number of designs themselves (between 45
and 121 each). They interacted with other community
members on an almost daily basis, and each had rated
around 80,000 designs.
In off-line communities, norms focusing on detec-
tion also appear to be of central importance. How-
ever, as with formal IP systems, detecting copies
is essentially the job of the originator (Oliar and
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Sprigman 2008).4 This difference might be due to the
fact that members of close-knit communities can typ-
ically see each other’s work directly and easily recog-
nize whether someone is copying another’s work (Fau-
chart and von Hippel 2008). Given the enormous size
of many online communities, policing norm violations
is necessarily a community task.
Norm 5: If you find that a design was copied, you must
make the copy case public. The public visibility of copy
cases and of the ensuing trial is an important element
of Threadless’ norms-based IP system. There is a clear
expectation that the police (either the “specialized”
police or other members who engage in policing activ-
ities only occasionally) should inform the community
about detected or suspected violations. As Table 1 indi-
cates, the norm “You must make the copy case pub-
lic” has two important functions: First, alerting the
community attracts the attention of other community
members and helps to prove a copy case; in some
instances, it may even uncover additional potential
violations by the same copyist. Moreover, it addresses
alleged violators directly and prompts them to pro-
vide explanations. Naturally, it also provides the basis
for enforcing the norms-based IP system, i.e., for col-
lective sanctioning behavior. The second function of
this norm is to inform new and inexperienced mem-
bers about existing norms, thereby contributing to a
coherent understanding of the norms-based IP sys-
tem within a community subject to constant turnover
and fluctuation. For social norms to function in such
a loose-knit community, it is important to articulate
them often and widely, and to demonstrate their per-
formance. Otherwise, it will be difficult for members
to become socialized to the norms of the community.
Although an awareness of norm violations is also
important in off-line communities, it appears that
norms requiring members to make alleged violations
public are less common in such settings. This may be
for two reasons: First, it may not be necessary to inform
the originators. In off-line communities, violations are
often detected by originators themselves (Oliar and
Sprigman 2008) or immediately become obvious to
them due to the smallness and close-knit character of
the community (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008). Sec-
ond, it may not be necessary to start a public trial.
The injured parties may be able to reestablish justice
discreetly with the offender (through negotiation or
some form of “vendetta”), particularly when they are
powerful themselves or have strong ties to influential
members (Raustiala and Sprigman 2012). This alterna-
tive hardly exists in anonymous online settings, thus
making public announcement indispensable.
4 One notable exception can be found in the community of stand-up
comedians, who typically watch the performances of several other
colleagues each night and use this wide exposure to police each
other (Oliar and Sprigman 2008).
Norm 6: The public trial must be fair. In our netno-
graphic analysis, we found 122 cases in which the
behavior of community members led us to conclude
that fairness of the public trial is a core value within
the Threadless community and a crucial requirement
for sustaining the norms-based IP system. Fairness is
a central concept for understanding social norms and
cooperation (Bicchieri 2006, Lind and Tyler 1988). If
social norms and their enforcement are not perceived
as fair (e.g., sanctions revealing greedy or selfish inten-
tions such as revenge), cooperation among otherwise
altruistic community members is likely to collapse
(Fehr and Rockenbach 2003).
Among the variety of examples in our cases, we
specifically identified three aspects that are central to
this norm (Table 1). First, community members must
never falsely accuse anyone, either on purpose or
because they were negligent in researching the case. As
Threadless user “Espe_Omne_Seir” indicated:
If you called out a design in the submission comments,
then later apologized for false accusation, it’s too late.
The damage has already been done. (blog entry)
The importance of this aspect is reflected in the
painstaking efforts made by community members
to ensure that their allegations are based on firm
grounds. Related to this is a second aspect of the
norm: If community members are convinced that
someone has stolen a design, they have to make the
evidence available to other members of the commu-
nity. Only then can other members decide on the case
and whether or not any action is justified. To sustain
the community-based enforcement of social norms,
it appears mandatory that trials are transparent and
clearly show whether or not potential sanctions are
legitimate. Third, it is also important to give alleged
copiers the opportunity to present their cases and
explain how the copy “happened,” why they do not
think it is a copy, or the extent to which mitigating
causes should be considered. The most important mit-
igating cause is that the (element or concept) copy
was made with permission from the original designer
(Norm 2). As in formal IP regimes, the burden of proof
lies with the plaintiff, meaning that the alleged copier
is innocent until proven guilty. The importance of this
norm is reflected by the fact that we found references to
the importance of a fair trial in 65.8% of all copy cases.
In off-line communities, “possible IP violations are
assessed by informal community consensus” (Fauchart
and von Hippel 2008, p. 187). Interestingly, none of the
studies of norms-based IP systems in off-line commu-
nities mention norms regarding how such community
consensus is achieved. It might be the case that a com-
plaint (“member X has stolen my IP”) might simply
be brought to the attention of a particularly influen-
tial member, and if that central member finds the case
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convincing, she might apply sanctions without much
further ado (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008). Sanctions
may therefore be more a function of the direct or indi-
rect power of the injured party, not necessarily of the
merits of the case. In online communities like Thread-
less, however, it is necessary to involve a broader rep-
resentation of the community in fair and transparent
adjudication to secure the legitimacy required for col-
lective sanctioning. It thus may be that the public
norms-based IP system in the Threadless community
results in fairer outcomes than in small, close-knit com-
munities (see Section 6).
Norm 7: If someone has been caught copying a design, you
must join in the collective sanctioning. When the “public
trial” comes to an end after arguments and facts have
been exchanged, some form of verdict typically results.
The verdict is not delivered by a higher authority or
a central member. Instead, community members judge
for themselves whether or not the alleged copier has
been found guilty in a fair trial and should therefore be
sanctioned. If community members are convinced that
a violation of the core norm “You must not copy” has
been proven and that there are no mitigating causes,
they are expected to take on the role of “executioners”
and follow the norm in the collective sanctioning of the
copier.
We observed that the Threadless community makes
use of several sanctioning mechanisms (Table 1). The
most frequently used form of sanction is downvoting
(79% of cases with sanctions), in which community
members give the copied design the lowest possible
score. This sanction goes hand in hand with warning
others that they should not give high scores for the
design. In many cases, more than half of the comments
on the design included such requests. Other sanctions
include censuring members who violate community
norms (42% of cases with sanctions) or putting them on
a watch list (15% of cases with sanctions). Community
members not only monitor future submissions from
individuals who have been caught copying a design;
some also engage in painstaking investigations by
checking earlier designs by suspected copiers for pos-
sible infringements. Indeed, in seven cases we found
that the community uncovered further instances of
copyright violations as a consequence of this increased
scrutiny. What these various forms of sanctioning used
by the Threadless community have in common is that
to be effective, they require collective action by a suf-
ficiently large number of community members. The
sanction of downvoting in particular would not have
much of an effect if only a few individuals gave a low
score. Only collective action ensures that the copier is
punished effectively. Similarly, censure or putting the
copier on a watch list are only powerful instruments
if there is a larger collective that endorses and partici-
pates in the sanctions. For this reason, Norm 7 is cen-
tral to enforcing the overall norms-based IP system at
Threadless. We found evidence of collective sanction-
ing in 49 out of 155 cases (31.6%).
Norms for sanctioning also exist in off-line commu-
nities, where both individual and collective retribution
appear to play an important role (Di Stefano et al. 2015,
Loshin 2010, Oliar and Sprigman 2008). The main dif-
ference between online and off-line communities is the
type of sanctions that can be effectively used to enforce
compliance with IP norms. Whereas the most effec-
tive form of sanctioning is often denial of access to the
community and its resources in off-line communities
(Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin 2010, Raustiala
and Sprigman 2012), similar sanctioning mechanisms
are typically ineffective in large online communities
like Threadless. Because quasi-unrestricted access is a
key feature of many online communities, they need to
resort to the other forms of sanctioning reported above.
5. Functioning of theNorms-Based
IP System in the Threadless
Community
Our second analytical lens is focused on the function-
ing of the norms-based IP system within the Thread-
less community. In Sections 5.1–5.3 we investigate the
interplay of the norms, analyze the effectiveness of the
system, and identify its enablers.
5.1. The Norms as a System
So far, we have mainly portrayed the norms-based IP
system within the Threadless community on the basis
of its components, i.e., the seven core norms. However,
the different components are interrelated and thereby
constitute a system (Simon 1962). An intuitive way to
illustrate how this system works is to map its compo-
nents using a stylized case of copying from submission
to sanctioning. The “legal procedure” we observed
upon an infringement of the central norm that pro-
hibits copying designs shows the different functions
of the norms, their completeness, and their parsimony
(Figure 2).
The process we observed in the 155 copy cases
closely resembles a criminal procedure (House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on the Judiciary 2013); how-
ever, it is decentralized and self-organized. Immedi-
ately after the submission of a design, the community
checks whether or not there might be any IP-related
issues. The basis for this is Norm 1 (You must not copy
designs). Decentralization is achieved through Norm 4,
which requires community members to be alert when-
ever they view a submission, i.e., when giving feed-
back or when giving the design a final score (If you
are suspicious about the origin of a design, you must check
whether it is a copy). When the individual commu-
nity member finds that the core norm has been vio-
lated, “charges are filed” and a trial is set in motion.
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Figure 2 Stylized “Legal Procedure” of a Copy Case from Submission to Sanction
Copy case is made public
Community
checks: Is it a
copy?
n
y
n
Design
submission
No action
Collective sanctions
No action
Community reviews the
copy case
Copier gets chance to
bring up mitigating causes 
Community
decides: Infringement
of norms? 
y
Norm 4: If suspicious, you
must check 
Norm 1: You must not copy
designs
Norm 5: You must make
the case public
Norm 3: You must credit the
original designer
Norm 2: You must ask the
original designer
Norm 6: The public trial
must be fair
Norm 7: You must join the
collective sanctioning
The first step of this procedure is to make the alle-
gations public by posting a comment on the submis-
sion page, which is regulated by Norm 5 (If you find
that a design was copied, you must make the case pub-
lic). This publicity gives the original creator and other
community members a chance to participate in the
trial and to demonstrate publicly how the community
deals with violations of its norms. Norm 6 (The public
trial must be fair) ensures that this delicate step follows
a due process commonly associated with developed
legal systems, which requires civilized methods of law
enforcement and procedural fairness (Tribe 1972). In
particular, it is important to ensure that the alleged
violator is heard in this process and has the opportu-
nity to present mitigating causes. This is most effective
if she is able to demonstrate adherence to Norms 2 (If
you wish to copy, you must ask the original designer) and 3
(If you copy, you must credit the original designer). This
process may include multiple iterations, but typically
does not take much time. Eventually, once the commu-
nity has come to a verdict and if the alleged copier is
found guilty, Norm 7 (If someone has been caught copy-
ing a design, you must join in the collective sanctioning)
ensures that the sentence is actually enforced. This
process not only shows how the seven norms interre-
late; it also becomes evident that each has a specific
function in the process and is therefore indispensable.
We also see that the norms reconstructed here are suf-
ficient to guide this “legal procedure.”
5.2. The Effectiveness of the
Norms-Based IP System
As an initial indicator of effectiveness, we examine
the effects of sanctions on the individuals involved: Do
they discourage the offenders and restore the victims’
trust in the community? Regarding the offenders, we
find that only 7.1% of them committed another copy-
right violation (under the same username) after being
caught. Many of the violators subsequently became
less active members of the community (34.0%) or even
stopped participating (22.7%). However, a large per-
centage of individuals became good citizens, main-
taining (23.4%) or even increasing (19.9%) the level at
which they contributed to the community. Regarding
the victims, the norms-based IP system also appears
to satisfy their need for protection, meaning that they
continue to be active community members. Among the
cases of copying in our sample, we could only find two
original designers who left the community. The vast
majority of original designers (72.3%) maintained or
even increased the level of their contributions. It thus
appears that the effects of the norms-based IP system
are positive.
A second indicator of the norms-based IP system’s
effectiveness is the relatively low total number of copy
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cases and their tendency to decrease over time. We
found only 155 cases in which imitation problems were
visible, which is not a particularly large number com-
pared to the hundreds of thousands of submissions.
The trend is clear: While the number of submissions at
Threadless has increased at an average annual growth
rate of over 30%, imitation problems have clearly
diminished. Such problems were somewhat present in
earlier years (2005–2006, 0.14% of submissions), but
their frequency began to drop in 2007 (0.11%), and they
had nearly disappeared by 2011 (0.03%). One obvious
interpretation is that both trends are due to the norms-
based IP system described above and its supportive
effect.
However, there is an important caveat to both indi-
cators. The number of copy cases we report relies on
positive cases only (i.e., the copy cases we were able
to identify in our netnography). It might be that we
missed copying incidents and have underestimated the
true number of cases. Even worse, it could be that the
community missed them as well. In fact, there could be
a substantial “dark figure” for violations that go unno-
ticed. Essentially, this would imply that the norms-
based IP system described above fails to govern the
behavior of community members. The low number
could thus be interpreted as an indicator that commu-
nity members simply do not care much about copying
issues. To account for this, we conducted a field experi-
ment. The hard test of the prevalence and effectiveness
of a norms-based IP system is whether the community
reacts to actual infringements of IP in the predicted
manner.
The results of our field experiment, in which we
submitted copies of 64 designs, clearly show that
the norms-based IP system is actually “lived” by the
Threadless community. In the example illustrated in
Figure 3, our copied design first found praise, albeit
intermingled with a first public hint by a policing
member, making the original designer aware of the
potential violation (“Jake3?”), then the public accusa-
tion of IP theft (Norms 1 and 5) with proof (i.e., the
link, Norm 4), the interrogation of the copier (Norm 6;
we did not respond, as this was part of our agreement
with Threadless and there were no mitigating causes),
and the start of the collective sanctioning (Norm 7).
All copies of designs with an original score that gave
them a reasonable chance of actually being printed
were detected by the community (within half a day).
Of the 32 copies with a score exceeding the median,
more than two-thirds (22 copies) were spotted (after
1.3 days on average). Naturally, the less popular
designs received somewhat less attention, resulting in
an overall detection rate of just under 50% within 1.4
days (30 of the 64 submitted copies; see Table 2 for
overview).
Figure 3 (Color online) Example of Community Response to Norm
Violation
SAY SOMETHIN’ NICE
IlCapone87 Jan 3. 2014
:D
alec_fx on Jan 3. 2014 at 18:59:47
Jake3?
sausage_mac on Jan 3. 2014 at 20:51:22
Clever! nice use of colrs, too.
dilarto on Jan 4. 2014 at 02:59:02
Great work! 5. :)
breakfastjuice on Jan 4. 2014 at 03:34:37
5
Cool_graphs on Jan 4. 2014 at 04:12:03
KOOL $!
gecco on Jan 4. 2014 at 17:59:27
Stolen design?
http://www.threadless.com/threadless/[original_design]
FRICKINGOOD on Jan 4. 2014 at 19:38:55
Yup, stolen design. I love this design so it hurts even more.
legbread on Jan 4. 2014 at 19:50:40
Why do you steal exactly the same design?
JAKE3 on Jan 4. 2014 at 21:25:11
Totally stolen. But I’m flattered you like it enough to claim as your own.
Lycracell on Jan 5. 2014 at 09:32:18
that’s sick...dude why do you steal a design? Is there no way to „flag“ this one?
hercules74 on Jan 5. 2014 at 21:40:04
I KNEW I SAW IT BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
STOLEN
dongeround on Jan 6. 2014 at 02:24:16
lol
tommy99 on Jan 6. 2014 at 08:39:34
please delete your account. we would love that
The reactions from the community corresponded to
the patterns predicted: The imitation was immediately
made public, typically proven with links to the orig-
inal, commented on negatively, etc. (Table 3). In all
cases, the core norm “You must not copy designs”
(Norm 1; 100%) was pervasive, as were the norms
with regard to making the case public (Norm 5; 93%),
the requirement of fairness (Norm 6; 83%), and the
imperative of checking for copies (Norm 4; 67%). Only
Norm 7 (27%) could not fully unfold, as in most cases
we managed to delete the design and the account
upon the first accusation, thus inhibiting collective
sanctioning behavior. (Norms 2 and 3 are relevant
only for derivative work based on other designs; since
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Table 2 Number of Copies Detected in Experiment
Number of Copies Percentage Avg. time Percentage detected
cases detected detected to detection (days) on same day
Original with potential for 3 3 100 0.5 100
printing (top score)
Popular originals 32 22 69 1.3 68
(above median score)
All designs 64 30 47 1.4 60
Table 3 Visibility of Norms in Community Response to Experiment
Number Percentage
of cases of cases
Norm 1: You must not copy designs. 30 100
Norm 2: If you wish to copy, you — —
must ask the original designer.a
Norm 3: If you copy, you must — —
credit the original designer.a
Norm 4: If you are suspicious about 20 67
the origin of a design, you must check
whether it is a copy.
Norm 5: If you find that a design was 28 93
copied, you must make the
case public.
Norm 6: The public trial must be fair. 25 83
Norm 7: If someone has been caught 8 27
copying a design, you must join
in the collective sanctioning.b
aNorms 2 and 3 are relevant only to derivative work based on other
designs.
bNorm 7 could not fully unfold because we deleted the designs upon the
first accusation.
the experiment involved exact copies only, these two
norms could hardly show up.)
This pattern yields corroborating evidence for the
characteristics and elements of the norms-based IP sys-
tem as we described it. It also underscores the alertness
of the community. Our findings suggest that the reason
for the surprisingly low (and decreasing) number of
copy cases we could identify is that there are only a few
cases of copying beyond the 155 cases we identified. In
turn, this means that the norms-based IP system within
the Threadless community is remarkably effective.
5.3. Enablers of the Norms-Based IP System in the
Threadless Community
The Threadless platform has technological affordances
that can be grouped in the categories of provid-
ing transparency, activating community members, and
empowering them to act.
First, the Threadless platform provides opportuni-
ties for online interaction among its community mem-
bers that go beyond the standard forums and blogs
used by many online communities and provide a
high level of transparency. At Threadless, each submit-
ted design or critique comes with its own discussion
section, where community members exchange their
thoughts about the design with their peers. All these
interactions leave digital traces that are stored in dig-
ital archives, making it possible for everyone in the
online community to see what others have been doing,
regardless of time and space. Open access to all current
and past designs enables the community to screen sub-
missions for potential IP violations. Extensive search
functionality and digital traces of all members’ activi-
ties and prior work (accessible in an organized struc-
ture from their public user profiles) are powerful tools
that peers can use when investigating suspected vio-
lations. The design submission page provides a pub-
lic forum to adjudicate cases of copying before the
whole community and to make norm violations as
well as their consequences (i.e., collective downvoting
and shaming) transparent to the community as well as
outsiders. Moreover, by following these digital traces
of member interactions, less experienced Threadless
members can observe what other community members
find acceptable or not (and often why) and thereby
infer the community norms with all their nuances.
Second, the Threadless platform activates commu-
nity members and encourages them to contribute to
the norms-based IP system. For example, upon enter-
ing the platform, members are prompted to score or
leave a comment on new designs. The platform re-
wards members for these contributions by automati-
cally highlighting these activities on their profile pages.
As a consequence, designs are exposed to an extremely
broad user base, which is a prerequisite for detecting
copies. By flagging a submitted design as a suspected
copy and linking to it from other pages on the platform
(e.g., designs, user profiles, forums, or blogs), commu-
nity members are able to attract the attention of peers
and involve more community members in the deliber-
ations on a potential violation, which is necessary for
the legitimacy of the verdict (Di Stefano et al. 2015)
and for collective sanctioning (Fauchart and von Hip-
pel 2008, Ostrom 1990).
Third, the Threadless platform empowers community
members with an interest in IP-related issues by giving
them the freedom and the tools to organize themselves
to maintain and further develop the norms-based IP
system. The “Threadless police” and other commu-
nity members have access to a blog as a dedicated
forum to discuss and update one another on suspected
copy cases. The links to suspected copies and a watch
list of “convicted” violators provide starting points for
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Threadless members interested in contributing to the
community by scrutinizing questionable cases. Once a
copyist is convicted, the submission page of the design
has built-in features that can be used for sanctioning.
The scoring mechanism, for example, can be used for
downvoting, and the comments section can be used
for various sanctioning mechanisms such as shaming,
warning other members not to give high scores, or call-
ing for further scrutiny of past and future submissions.
Although all these features enable community mem-
bers to contribute to the protection of the community’s
IP, it is left up to each individual to decide whether or
not (and how) they use them. As a result, there are no
automatisms involved in this norms-based IP system,
but the community as a whole shapes the system.
6. Discussion
Our study sheds some light on how online communi-
ties excel in innovation despite weak protection from
formal IP systems: The IP of individual participants
is well protected by an informal and self-organized
norms-based IP system. The system we identified
within the Threadless community consists of seven
widely accepted and interrelated norms that effec-
tively regulate the community’s behavior with regard
to IP and provide the basis for the celebrated level of
cooperation and innovation it achieves. Our findings
contribute to the literature on norms-based IP systems
(Di Stefano et al. 2014, Fauchart and von Hippel 2008,
Loshin 2010, Oliar and Sprigman 2008) by suggesting
that the relatively small size and close-knit relation-
ships of off-line communities are not a prerequisite for
a functioning norms-based IP system, as they can effec-
tively be substituted. Our study also contributes to the
literature on innovation in online communities in gen-
eral (Dahlander and Frederiksen 2012, Faraj et al. 2011,
Jeppesen and Frederiksen 2006, O’Mahony and Ferraro
2007, von Krogh et al. 2012, Wasko and Faraj 2005). The
role of IP has attracted great interest in this field. In
fact, the norm and practice of freely revealing IP can be
seen as one of the fundamental tenets of online com-
munities (Harhoff et al. 2003, Henkel 2006, von Hippel
2007, von Hippel and von Krogh 2006). Our research
adds a new twist to IP in online settings: online com-
munities not only generate and openly share IP; under
specific circumstances, they also foster and protect IP.
In our research, we studied only a single case (the
Threadless crowdsourcing community), and we gener-
alize our findings by developing propositions. These
propositions focus on the similarities and differences
between norms-based IP systems in online and off-line
settings and on contingency factors that may influence
the existence, gestalt, and effectiveness of norms-based
IP systems in online communities.
6.1. Similarities and Differences Between
Norms-Based IP Systems in Online and
Off-Line Settings
To date, the literature on norms-based IP systems
has focused on small, close-knit, off-line communities
(Dreyfuss 2010, Fauchart and von Hippel 2008, Loshin
2010, Oliar and Sprigman 2008). With this article, we
heed the calls issued by Fauchart and von Hippel
(2008) and Di Stefano et al. (2014) for more research
into this fascinating phenomenon under systematically
different conditions. Online communities are typically
open, anonymous, large scale, and loose knit, and their
members are highly heterogeneous and join the com-
munities for a limited time only. Despite these differ-
ent conditions, we find that—at least in our case—
norms-based IP systems in online communities share
core characteristics with social norms in off-line com-
munities. Most importantly, there also appears to be
a strong norm that prohibits (exact) copying in online
communities. Combined with painful collective sanc-
tions imposed on violators, this norm effectively pro-
tects community members from the misappropriation
of IP (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008). At the same
time, the norms allow the potential positive effects of
learning and imitation because they do not forbid any
and all forms of copying. In fact, by prescribing the
steps to be taken to make a copy legitimate (asking
for permission and, if granted, giving due credit to
the originator), the norms-based IP system encourages
positive copying because it creates legal certainty for
community members who want to build on the prior
work of others. If community members adhere to these
norms, such positive copying advances the knowledge
and craft of the overall community (Loshin 2010, Raus-
tiala and Sprigman 2012), and, thanks to the norm of
attribution, it can even benefit the originator and thus
promote sharing (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008). It
appears that what is critical is not so much the nature
of the community (off-line versus online), but the pos-
sibility of making violations visible and the availability
of low-cost, effective sanctions.
Proposition 1. Norms-based IP systems in online com-
munities entail similar core norms as off-line communities
to foster positive copying and preclude negative copying.
On the other hand, the different boundary condi-
tions in online communities require additional norms.
In close-knit off-line communities, it appears to be
less of an issue how a suspected norm violation
is detected, investigated, and adjudicated. Individ-
ual members can be quite powerful, and commu-
nity verdicts are typically reached on the basis of an
informal consensus that emerges immediately (Fau-
chart and von Hippel 2008) and is supported by
the homogeneity and close-knit relationships result-
ing from the strong socialization of community mem-
bers (Ostrom 2000). Fauchart and von Hippel (2008)
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also allude to the critical role that influential com-
munity members play in reaching a verdict. In the
often enormously large online communities, by con-
trast, it is virtually impossible for the injured party
to restore justice individually. There are no “author-
ities” in the sense that specific members sketch out
what behavior is generally accepted or not (legislative
function), determine in individual cases whether or
not a community member acted in compliance with
those norms (judiciary function), or take on the role of
central law enforcement (executive function). Rather,
all three powers are highly distributed, publicly con-
trolled, and in a way follow democratic principles.
This is achieved by social norms that demand trans-
parency and broad participation (Norms 4–7). These
norms ensure that numerous members screen sub-
missions for potential violations, even encouraging
some to serve the community as dedicated “Thread-
less police.” This collective policing is important in
light of the low level of ex ante transparency due to the
plethora of information being exchanged on the plat-
form and the large number of potential IP violators.
We find that the norms ensure that this disadvantage
relative to off-line communities is offset by the much
larger number of potential detectors of fraud. We can
summarize this effect by rephrasing Raymond’s (1999)
dictum as “Given enough eyeballs, all fraud is obvi-
ous.” This possibility of highly effective monitoring
may be one of several reasons why many off-line com-
munities go online. For example, off-line food com-
munities increasingly use websites to facilitate more
effective and decentralized detection of copying by
using photographs and detailed critiques (Fauchart
and von Hippel 2008, Raustiala and Sprigman 2012).
Moreover, transparency and broad participation are
also important in the public trial that ultimately results
in a verdict as to whether an alleged copyist has vio-
lated IP-related norms and thus deserves punishment
by the community as a whole.
Proposition 2. Norms-based IP systems in online com-
munities entail additional norms that ensure that the
legislative, judiciary, and executive functions are broadly
distributed across the community.
This broad participation of the community and the
separation of powers that comes along with it is an
important characteristic of norms-based IP systems in
online communities. Unlike in off-line communities,
where injured parties often drive the enforcement of
IP norms (Di Stefano et al. 2015, Oliar and Sprigman
2008), victims in online communities act only as wit-
nesses for the prosecution. The fact that they do not
serve justice themselves provides the basis for a par-
ticularly civilized legal system. On one hand, such
a system precludes the possibility that outraged vic-
tims might seek draconic retaliation themselves; on
the other hand, it also ensures the protection of weak
victims who would not be capable of defending their
rights on their own. Decentralization and transparency
also prevent community members from becoming so
powerful that they can use the system as a form
of autocracy or ostracism, both of which are poten-
tial risks in off-line communities (Bicchieri 2006). For
example, we found that the Threadless community
reprimands the “Threadless police” if they transgress
their role and make unsubstantiated allegations or
engage in independent and premature “vigilantism.”
Pinker (2011) provides strong evidence that ceding the
right to punish to a “Leviathan” that represents the will
of its people is a central mechanism for the decline of
violence in our society. We suspect that this mechanism
operates successfully in online communities as well. In
addition, the public trial and transparent deliberations
on fairness educate less experienced community mem-
bers as to what types of behavior the community finds
acceptable or not (and why). This is of utmost impor-
tance in an online setting, as it compensates for the lack
of socialization that comes along with large size and
unrestricted access.
6.2. A Contingency View of Norms-Based IP
Systems in Online Communities
Norms-based IP systems most likely differ from com-
munity to community. Therefore, we first propose con-
ditions that make a well-established norms-based IP
system more likely to emerge. Second, we propose
determinants that shape the nature of the system (if
it exists). Third, we propose factors that increase the
effectiveness of such a system.
6.2.1. Facilitating Conditions. In the Threadless
community, members exchange and contribute IP of
considerable value—T-shirt designs have economic
value that can be monetized on markets (Piller 2011),
and their subjective artistic value for their originators
and other community members may be even higher
(Brabham 2010). The community shares the ideals of
creativity and originality, meaning that authentic, orig-
inal designs are highly valued by the community. Mul-
tilateral efforts for monitoring and protection appear
to be rational if the IP is considered valuable by indi-
vidual members and by the community collectively
(Ostrom 1990). On the other hand, in communities of
interest or relationships (Armstrong and Hagel 2000) in
which members only exchange opinions, experiences,
or trivia, this might be different (e.g., in communi-
ties like Momslikeme.com, slashfilm.com). Naturally,
value partly lies in the eye of the beholder, and “many
users expect to be credited for authoring,” as Nelson
(2011, p. 749) observes with regard to Twitter mes-
sages, suggesting that the minimum value required for
the emergence of basic IP-related norms may not be
very high. If potential losses are negligible, however,
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the collective action necessary to develop and maintain
a commons like a norms-based IP system is unlikely
(Ostrom 2000). We hence argue that the value of IP
shared and exchanged in the community is a first facil-
itating condition:
Proposition 3. Norms-based IP systems are more likely
to emerge and become established in online communities in
which the IP being exchanged is considered highly valuable.
Another characteristic of the Threadless community
is that IP protection by a central authority is not very
effective. Formal IP regimes (i.e., copyright law) only
apply to a limited extent, and the legal terms and con-
ditions issued by Threadless, the company behind the
community, are difficult to enforce. Generalizing this
observation, we find that many online communities
extend beyond national jurisdictions, making lawsuits
complex, time consuming, expensive, and uncertain in
their outcomes (Oliar and Sprigman 2008). The result-
ing ineffectiveness of IP regulation imposed by a cen-
tral authority appears as a condition facilitating the
emergence of norms-based IP systems. If, on the other
hand, formal IP systems exist and effectively regulate
IP in a community, individual members have no rea-
son to make an effort and contribute to a norms-based
IP system (Raustiala and Sprigman 2012).
Proposition 4. Norms-based IP systems are more likely
to emerge and become established in online communities in
which formal IP law or the rules set by a central authority
are ineffective.
As we outlined in our findings, the Threadless com-
munity operates on an online platform with specific
qualities that enable an effective norms-based IP sys-
tem. We suggest that the likelihood of norms-based IP
systems is increased by the presence of similar techni-
cal features that offer the three core affordances. The
first is that the system facilitates what Zuboff (1988)
called “universal transparency.” Digital traces (Agar-
wal et al. 2008) and open access to all current and
past designs enable the community to screen contri-
butions for potential IP violations. This transparency
serves as a substitute for direct social relationships
and facilitates socialization into the community (Colfer
and Baldwin 2016). The second affordance is that the
system activates community members and encourages
them to contribute to the norms-based IP system. By
prompting individuals to participate in activities such
as screening or sanctioning, online platforms ensure
broad participation throughout the community. Simi-
lar to open source software communities, where it is
virtually impossible for any one individual to detect
and resolve the multitude of problems, a collective
effort makes this daunting task feasible even in enor-
mously large online communities (Raymond 1999).
The third is that the platform offers tools that empower
community members to create, maintain, and further
develop the norms-based IP system in a process of self-
organization (Ostrom 2000).
Proposition 5. Norms-based IP systems are more likely
to emerge and become established in online communities
where the platform offers features that facilitate trans-
parency, activate members, and empower them to self-
organize.
6.2.2. Determinants of the Nature of Norms-
Based IP Systems. Norms-based IP systems might
take different forms. In the Threadless community, the
norms-based IP system is “complete”—it regulates all
relevant aspects of IP in the community, ranging from
the issue of what forms of copying are allowed or not
to the rules of a public trial and collective sanction-
ing. This is typically the consequence of an external
authority (the organizing company) that fully grants a
community the right to self-regulate IP, i.e., to devise
extensive rules and enforce social norms themselves
(Ostrom 1990). In other cases, the company hosting
a community may decide to regulate specific aspects
of a system, while the community takes on a comple-
mentary supporting role. Steam, an online gaming and
developer platform, is an example of such an online
community. Content shared on this platform is sub-
ject to copyright protection, and Valve (the company
behind Steam) requires community members to sign
a legal agreement in which they commit to comply
with formal IP regulations. However, the online com-
munity is so large that Valve is not able to safeguard
IP by itself and thus delegates part of the policing
task to the community (Chalk 2015). Specifically, Valve
encourages community members to screen the plat-
form for violations and has created a reporting system
to flag suspected cases and provide evidence. How-
ever, Valve is the formal authority that performs key
functions of the IP system, such as ruling on alleged IP
infringements and sanctioning violations by blocking
access to the platform. Social norms are a substitute for
missing formal IP regulations and complement formal
arrangements where they are not sufficiently effective
(Lazzarini et al. 2004). We thus argue that the scope
of the formal IP system determines the scope of the
norms-based IP system.
Proposition 6. The smaller the scope of the formal
IP system set and maintained by a central authority in
online communities, the greater the scope of the norms-based
IP system.
The Threadless community is characterized by
strong cooperative elements. As our data show, social
norms effectively encourage Threadless members to
learn from each other and take the designs submit-
ted by others as sources of inspiration. As a result,
the norms support the positive aspects of copying
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(Aghion et al. 2009), ensuring that valuable knowl-
edge and information remain freely accessible to all
community members (and beyond) so that they can
be reused as widely as possible. Social norms provide
“legal certainty” by specifying how and under what
conditions community members are allowed to reuse
their peers’ IP, but these norms also include provi-
sions that ensure some return for originators of valu-
able IP. This is an important aspect, as this incentive is
required to guarantee that community members con-
tinue to freely share and exchange their knowledge.
Other communities in which norms encourage posi-
tive copying include open source software communi-
ties (e.g., Linux) or communities dedicated to music
(e.g., SoundCloud), pictures (e.g., Flickr), or videos
(e.g., Vimeo). They all have strong social norms to
ensure that the knowledge shared and exchanged in
the online community continues to be open and acces-
sible as a common good. In combination with instru-
ments backed by formal IP law such as the General
Public License or the Creative Commons license (Elkin-
Koren 2005, Stallman 1999), these social norms foster
further positive copying by other community mem-
bers. Interestingly, even in these cooperative settings,
we frequently find the “attribution norm,” which states
that the originator must be given credit for any infor-
mation that is reused (Posner 2007). This is clearly an
IP-related norm. However, such communities hardly
make any effort to limit the reuse of their knowl-
edge, as it is considered to be an “inverse commons”
(Raymond 1999), which becomes all the more valuable
when more community members use it.
Proposition 7. The norms-based IP system in online
communities characterized by a high level of cooperation will
safeguard positive copying.
Threadless is not only a cooperative community.
There is also a rivalry between members, who com-
pete for attention, reputation, and prize money (Brab-
ham 2010). Accordingly, the norms-based IP system
protects valuable knowledge from misappropriation,
an important function normally associated with for-
mal IP regimes (Jaffe 2000). The norms regulate which
forms of copying constitute a violation and how
potential violations should be policed, adjudicated,
and sanctioned. In general, competitive crowdsourcing
platforms are a form of online community in which
rivalry is propelled by the incentives (typically money)
defined by the organizer and by the reputational value
attached to winning a tournament. While some crowd-
sourcing communities (such as Threadless) also have
collaborative elements, others are predominantly com-
petitive in nature. This is clearly the case in crowd-
sourcing contests (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013) such
as Tongal or crowdSPRING. In such a setting, IP needs
to be protected to ensure that community members
make an effort to develop and share innovative ideas.
Such communities crack down on plagiarism heavily
to avoid copyright problems when clients choose solu-
tions from the platform later on (Samson 2012). The
potential value of positive copying, on the other hand,
receives very little attention, if any, in this type of com-
petitive online community.
Proposition 8. The norms-based IP system in online
communities characterized by a high level of rivalry will
protect members from misappropriation.
6.2.3. Key Factors for the Effectiveness of Norms-
Based IP Systems in Online Communities. The tech-
nological affordances described above provide the sine
qua non for the norms-based IP system. The features
built into the platform make it possible to achieve high
transparency and to make fraud visible, even in such
an enormously large community. These features also
activate and empower community members to shape
and support the norms-based IP system. However,
these enablers constitute mere preconditions. Motiva-
tional factors are needed to explain why the commu-
nity members use these features and adhere to the sys-
tem as a group. Based on our study of Threadless, we
see two complementary factors explaining community
members’ motivation to adhere to a norms-based IP
system in online communities.
The first is a rational choice explanation: We argue
that Threadless members adhere to the norms system
because it is worth it to them. Deterrence theory sug-
gests that the certainty and severity of punishment
determine the likelihood of violations of the norms
(Elster 1989, Peace et al. 2003, Posner 1997). As we saw
in our field experiment, the probability that an IP vio-
lation will be detected is quite high in the Threadless
community. The punishment also appears to be rel-
atively severe. The most direct effect is the threat of
downvoting regardless of the design’s potential cre-
ative value; this is usually accompanied by severe cen-
sure. Responses from alleged violators suggest that,
despite their anonymity, such harsh community reac-
tions have emotional effects. In general, studies show
that dismay and consternation are typical reactions
among users who face bullying (e.g., Lee 2005). At the
same time, sanctions may extend beyond individual
designs. Community members who violate IP norms
risk having past and future designs painstakingly scru-
tinized by the community. More broadly, by violat-
ing IP norms, individuals risk any reputation and sta-
tus they have developed in the community. All merits
and achievements within the community (e.g., a track
record of successful designs, a reputation as a help-
ful and constructive reviewer, scoring activities) are
linked to their user profile. Thus, the social capital con-
tained in this identity can be considerable, and dam-
age can therefore represent a major loss (Steinkuehler
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and Williams 2006). The public visibility of the copy
cases and sanctions also speak to this aspect. We found
that the public trials not only involve many commu-
nity members but also that users often link to the case
in other discussions, thus further enhancing its visi-
bility to the community and increasing the severity of
the punishment faced by the violator. It also shows
the consequences of norm violations to deter other
individuals from deviance in the future, a key aspect
of deterrence theory (Polinsky and Shavell 1999). The
rational choice argument also explains the efforts of
individuals to enforce community norms. We observed
that many active users are members of the “Threadless
police” and contribute to sustaining the norms-based
IP system in the Threadless community. For such users,
the viability of the community is of particularly high
importance, suggesting that the norms-based IP sys-
tem is fueled by a rational calculus. We suggest that
our observations from the study of Threadless can be
generalized to online communities in other contexts.
If the expected utility of violating the norm is greater
than the expected utility of adhering to it, a ratio-
nal actor will prefer to violate the norm (Savage 1954,
von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Vriend 1996).
The tenets of this theory underlie legal systems (Polin-
sky and Shavell 1999, Posner 1985) as well as close-
knit off-line communities with regard to IP norms
(Fauchart and von Hippel 2008)—and probably also
norms-based IP systems in online communities:
Proposition 9. The norms-based IP system in online
communities will be more effective if the expected utility
of adhering to IP-related norms and contributing to their
enforcement is high.
We suggest that a second factor also explains why
Threadless members largely adhere to the norms sys-
tem: ideology. Communities are usually defined as
social units with shared common values that bind them
internally, distinguish them externally, and provide an
entity they can identify with (Cohen 2001). The Thread-
less community appears to be no exception. Brabham
(2010) finds that its members strongly identify with the
brand and feel love for the community. Ideology and
firmly held convictions regarding “how one should
behave” regarding IP norms are also reflected in many
comments in the discussion forums, for example:
I just wanna say and I think this is kind of the spirit
of threadless (or part of the spirit) we all respect the
system so much, we watch out for it. We participate
in it and are it and help people follow the rules not
in order to seek out rule breakers but to maintain the
magic as a whole 0 0 0 it’s not easy to quantify magic.”
(Survey response)
In addition to preventing misappropriation, this
identification with community values also effectively
fosters positive copying. If community members
seeking inspiration from other designs identify with
the core value of originality, it is unlikely that they
will simply copy elements or concepts (i.e., “nega-
tive” copying). Instead, one can expect that they will
put in the creativity and effort required to create a
derivative design that has original value in its own
right (i.e., “positive” copying). Moreover, as described
above, original designers have a moral obligation to
allow other community members to reuse parts of their
designs or concepts creatively, which further encour-
ages positive copying. We expect that this adherence
to social norms due to identification with commu-
nity values is not specific to Threadless. In general,
there are many incidents in which people comply with
norms without economic incentives to do so (Paternos-
ter 1987, Paternoster and Simpson 1996, Tyler 1996).
They comply because it simply appears to be “the right
thing” to do (Jackson et al. 2012, Tyler 1990). A number
of studies have reported on the prevalence of strong
binding norms and ideology in online communities
(Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006, Franke and Shah 2003,
Stewart and Gosain 2006, von Krogh et al. 2003). We
thus suggest the following:
Proposition 10. The norms-based IP system in online
communities will be more effective if members strongly iden-
tify with the community.
6.3. Managerial Implications
Our findings have implications for organizations wish-
ing to set up a crowdsourcing community, as there is
consensus among scholars in this field that we need to
deepen our understanding of the principles that facili-
tate the viability and success of such communities (e.g.,
Hoyer et al. 2010, Nambisan and Baron 2010, Terwi-
esch and Xu 2008). Managing IP issues is generally
crucial to the success of crowdsourcing (Lakhani and
Panetta 2007, Nambisan 2002, Ogawa and Piller 2006).
However, unlike functions such as the generation of
new ideas and concepts (the “heart” of the crowdsourc-
ing idea; e.g., Brabham 2008, Poetz and Schreier 2012),
user-to-user assistance (e.g., Jeppesen and Frederik-
sen 2006, West and Lakhani 2008), and collaborative
filtering and community voting as a means to iden-
tify the best submissions (Brabham 2010, Surowiecki
2005), protecting IP has been seen as the organizing
company’s responsibility up to now (e.g., Feller et al.
2012, Vukovic and Bartolini 2010).
However, our search suggests that the function of
protecting participants’ IP can also be effectively “crowd-
sourced” to the community. This is good news for com-
panies, as it means that another important and difficult
function of new product ideation can be delegated to
the crowd—with high effectiveness and at low cost.
To achieve this, organizers should first ensure that
the platform entails the necessary technological affor-
dances of transparency, activation, and empowerment
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described in Section 5.3. For example, features such as
digital archives and traces of a member’s activities and
prior work, search functions, a public user profile, the
invitation to score contributions or leave comments,
public forums and blogs, tagging functions, the option
of providing links to other submissions, and, perhaps
most important, a scoring feature that allows effec-
tive collective sanctioning are powerful tools that ren-
der an effective norms-based IP system possible. The
second step is to “spark” active self-governance of IP
by reinforcing the motivational drivers of community
members’ adherence to the norms-based IP system.
While deterrence may be amplified by clearly signaling
that the company will cooperate with the community
closely and take its verdicts seriously (and potentially
impose additional formal sanctions on violators), ide-
ology can be supported by very active members who
contribute heavily to the community and act as role
models, demonstrating the desired behavior, and pro-
moting positive community spirit. Platform operators
may bind such individuals to the community by offer-
ing them a special “alumnus” status and other means
of recognition that nurture their identification with
the community and incentivize others to contribute
actively to the community as well.
6.4. Limitations and Opportunities for
Further Research
Our analysis is based entirely on a single case, the
Threadless community. Naturally, any generalizations
should be undertaken with due caution. Other online
communities are based on different organizational
forms, different underlying products, and different
overall functions. Threadless is one of the largest and
most successful crowdsourcing communities today,
and it has been for several years. Studying such a case
is both a disadvantage and an advantage at the same
time. It is a disadvantage because Threadless is cer-
tainly not representative of other crowdsourcing com-
munities, let alone online communities in general, and
the conclusion that similar systems operate in all online
communities would be more than premature. On the
other hand, it is also an advantage, as the success of
this specific online community may be at least partly
due to the existence of this highly effective norms-
based IP system, which suggests that much can be
learned from this “best practice” case. The proposi-
tions we suggest are no more than a first attempt to
scope out different norms-based IP systems that can
be found in the fascinating variety of online commu-
nities. Future research may refine this framework by
adding further contingency factors and systematically
analyzing how examples of norms-based IP systems
in other online communities differ from the Thread-
less case in their characteristics and functioning. A sec-
ond limitation is that we take a “within-community”
perspective in all of our research. This means that we
limit our focus to copying and imitation from Thread-
less designs to other Threadless designs. IP can, of
course, also be stolen from outside the community
(e.g., from artwork, books, CD covers, etc.), and in par-
ticular it can also be stolen from the Threadless com-
munity and used elsewhere. The reason for this lim-
itation is mostly technical: It is difficult to follow-up
empirically on such violations and the measures com-
munity members take outside the community. At the
same time, we note that this would be another oppor-
tunity for further research. A third limitation is the
selection bias and the moderate sample size in our sur-
vey, which might have affected our findings to some
degree. However, we did not find evidence of such
effects, and our triangulation with other data sources
yields further confidence that our main conclusions
hold. Fourth, we are not able to answer the questions of
when and how such norms-based IP systems emerge
at all. Ostrom’s (1990, 2000) work on the governance
of commons might provide a theoretical basis for this
undertaking. Her research suggests a set of factors that
make the emergence of long-surviving, self-organized
governance regimes likely (Ostrom 2000). Empirical
research could be conducted using a longitudinal per-
spective based on archival data. It would be fascinating
to examine how norms-based IP systems in commu-
nities come into being, how different norms evolve,
develop, and change over time, and which events or
participants trigger such processes. Finally, we studied
norms-based IP systems only in conditions involving
valuable IP, rivalry, and the limited effectiveness of for-
mal IP systems. Future research might not only extend
and refine the contingency view we have provided
but also scrutinize the characteristics and functioning
of norms-based IP systems in systematically different
forms of online communities. Altogether, there appear
to be ample opportunities for important and fruit-
ful research in the area of norms-based IP systems in
online communities.
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Appendix
Table A.1 Description of Sample for Online Survey
Analyzed variables n Mean Median SD Min. Max. Additional remarks
Number of designs in “Submissions” a 143 39034 18 51068 0 288 % of people who did not submit any designs: 21.70% (31)
Number of designs in “Critiques” a 145 2072 0 7071 0 70 % of people who did not submit any critiques: 63.40% (92)
Number of designs in “Products” a 143 2043 0 5001 0 42 % of people who did not submit any products: 51.70% (74)
Age b 158 28012 2705 6082 17 57
Length of membership in monthsa 40015 3900
Visits to website b 160 1 = daily visits to website: 85.00% (136)
2 = weekly visits to website: 13.75% (22)
3 = monthly visits to website: 1.25% (2)
4 = less frequently: 0% (0)
Interaction with other membersb 160 1 = daily interaction: 71.88% (115)
2 = weekly interaction: 21.25% (34)
3 = monthly interaction: 2.50% (4)
4 = less frequently: 4.38% (7)
Sex b 158 % female: 29.75% (47)
% male: 70.25% (111)
aData according to information on the website.
bData according to the survey.
Table A.2 Description of Sample for Experiment
Number of Number of scores Days between
posts on received by Mean score original and Copy Days until
Original original original of original copy detected detection
1 2 146 2073 24 no
2 3 244 2061 24 yes 0
3 11 270 205 28 no
4 2 240 203 44 no
5 2 214 2071 44 no
6 10 239 2094 35 no
7 11 182 2048 30 yes 4
8 1 218 207 33 no
9 19 336 209 31 no
10 16 291 2076 37 no
11 23 264 3033 35 yes 4
12 6 220 2087 32 yes 5
13 0 162 208 36 no
14 3 169 2053 35 no
15 59 456 3043 25 yes 0
16 14 217 2088 36 no
17 12 168 2096 37 yes 0
18 19 535 3003 34 no
19 17 288 3027 36 yes 0
20 13 222 2079 36 yes 0
21 4 203 2053 30 no
22 5 167 2069 33 no
23 2 119 2035 32 no
24 9 200 2069 35 no
25 1 120 2048 35 no
26 9 295 2055 34 no
27 2 179 2067 23 no
28 5 202 2091 26 no
29 14 225 3025 28 yes 2
30 6 295 2042 33 no
31 4 206 2039 32 no
32 24 440 2093 35 no
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Number of Number of scores Days between
posts on received by Mean score original and Copy Days until
Original original original of original copy detected detection
33 52 430 3054 32 yes 0
34 1 321 203 32 no
35 6 241 2081 31 no
36 19 329 2052 33 no
37 10 211 2082 32 yes 3
38 1 221 2027 35 no
39 3 235 2049 29 yes 1
40 21 301 3015 33 yes 0
41 9 265 3009 32 yes 0
42 3 226 2039 30 yes 0
43 3 191 2018 35 no
44 31 353 3024 28 yes 0
45 46 573 3038 27 yes 1
46 3 154 2021 34 no
47 24 778 3024 29 yes 0
48 5 244 2055 30 no
49 29 745 3024 32 yes 0
50 5 259 2081 32 yes 1
51 4 177 2099 32 yes 0
52 3 177 2094 31 yes 0
53 1 173 2052 31 no
54 29 429 3034 34 yes 0
55 6 187 2073 32 yes 1
56 16 373 3019 34 yes 0
57 16 280 302 31 yes 1
58 5 198 2079 35 no
59 4 236 2024 30 no
60 19 319 2086 29 no
61 37 499 3043 32 yes 0
62 6 260 2054 27 yes 3
63 6 162 2038 30 yes 1
64 7 185 2044 32 yes 0
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